Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivity by Dogan, Pinar
 
Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivity
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Dogan, Pinar. 2009. Vertical Networks, Integration, and
Connectivity. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
18(2): 347-392.
Published Version http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-
9134.2009.00217.x/abstract
Accessed February 19, 2015 8:35:48 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4863169
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA.
Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivityz
Pınar DO˘ GAN
Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
pinar_dogan@ksg.harvard.edu
z I am greatly indebted to an anonymous coeditor of this journal for comments and suggestions that
lead to signiﬁcant improvements in this paper. I also thank Jacques Crémer, Patrick Rey, Dani Rodrik, and
Yeon-Koo Che for their extremely useful suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. An earlier version of
this paper was circulated as "Vertical Integration in the Internet Industry."Abstract
This paper studies competition in a network industry with a stylized two layered network structure,
and examines: (i) price and connectivity incentives of the upstream netwoks, and (ii) incentives for vertical
integration between an upstream network provider and a downstream ﬁrm. The main result of this paper is
that vertical integration occurs only if the initial installed-base diﬀerence between the upstream networks is
suﬃciently small, and in that case, industry is conﬁgured with two vertically integrated networks, which yields
highest incentives to invest in quality of interconnection. When the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently
large, there is no integration in the industry, and neither of the ﬁrms have an incentive to invest in quality of
interconnection. An industry conﬁgration in which only the large network integrates and excludes (or raises
cost of) its downstream rival does not appear as an equilibrium outcome: in the presence of a large asymmetry
between the networks, when quality of interconnection is a strategic variable, the large network can exercise
a substantial market power without vertical integration. Therefore, a vertically separated industry structure
does not necessarily yield pro-competitive outcomes.
Keywords: Vertical Integration, Interconnection, Network Externalities.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L13; L22; L86.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, I consider an industry with a stylized two-layered network structure. Within a given geograph-
ical area, two horizontally diﬀerentiated downstream ﬁrms compete to supply connectivity to end-users. In
the upstream market, two interconnected networks with asymmetric installed-bases compete to provide con-
nectivity to downstream ﬁrms. The quality of interconnection between the upstream networks is inferior
to the quality of connectivity within a given network (on-net connectivity), unless both networks undertake
costly investments. I analyze competition in such an industry, focusing on the incentives for vertical inte-
gration and the implications for the equilibrium quality of interconnection between upstream networks. A
key result is that vertical foreclosure—in which the large upstream ﬁrm integrates downwards and excludes
( o rr a i s e st h ec o s t so f )t h eo t h e rd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm—is never an equilibrium in this setting. Depending on the
diﬀerence in installed bases upstream, either both ﬁrms integrate vertically or neither does.
I show that when the installed base diﬀerence between the networks is suﬃciently small, the equilibrium
industry conﬁguration is characterized by two vertically integrated networks. This is true regardless of
which network moves ﬁrst to decide on integration, as vertical integration is the dominant strategy for both
networks for small installed base diﬀerences. Two successive mergers not only yield the lowest prices among
all industry conﬁgurations, but also the highest incentives to invest in quality of interconnection.
When the installed base diﬀerence between the networks is suﬃciently large, the equilibrium industry
conﬁguration is characterized instead by vertical separation, and neither one of the networks invests in
quality of interconnection. The reason is as follows. For a given degree of asymmetry in the installed bases,
a lower quality of interconnection facilitates exercise of market power by the large network, which in turn
has no incentives to invest in quality of interconnection. When the industry is vertically separated, for the
range of connectivity prices such that both downstream ﬁrms obtain non-negative proﬁts regardless of their
network choice, choosing an upstream network for connectivity constitutes a coordination (sub)game. Both
downstream ﬁrms get symmetric proﬁts as long as they connect to the same upstream network, and they
obtain the same proﬁts regardless of which network they coordinate on. But the presence of an asymmetry in
the installed bases makes connecting to the small network a risky strategy, which enables the large network
to supply connectivity to both ﬁrms, and at a higher price than that set by the smaller network. When the
1quality of interconnection is poor, a larger installed base advantage translates to higher connectivity prices
(that are ultimately passed on the end-users), and hence to higher proﬁts for the large network. The result is
that the large network ends up supplying both downstream ﬁrms.1 This is a similar result to those obtained
in models of competing upstream ﬁrms with asymmetric costs.2
Finally, regardless of which network moves ﬁrst, an industry conﬁguration in which only the large network
integrates and raises its downstream rival’s cost (or forecloses it) does not emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
An interesting feature here is that when the small network moves ﬁrst and does not integrate, the large
network does not integrate either, if the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently large. This is because vertical
integration does not facilitate the large network’s exercise of market power in this instance, and vertically
separated industry yields higher industry proﬁts than any other industry structure (at the expense of higher
prices for end-consumers). Therefore if the asymmetry between the networks’ installed-bases is large, a
vertically separated industry structure does not necessarily yield pro-competitive outcomes.
This is a result that contrasts with the vertical foreclosure literature in which upstream ﬁrms provide
a homogenous inputs to downstream. For example, in the successive duopoly considered by Ordover et al.
(1990), where upstream ﬁrms compete a-la-Bertrand with homogenous products, vertical foreclosure followed
by integration is an equilibrium outcome. Beard et al (2001) consider a successive duopoly setting in which
one upstream sector is dominated by one ﬁrm. They show that the vertically integrated dominant ﬁrm
may raise its downstream rival’s cost by degrading its quality of input—what the authors call sabotage—in
particular when the dominant ﬁrm’s pricing decisions are constrained by regulation.3 In their seminal paper,
Hart and Tirole (1990) provide analysis for three variant models. The setting in the present paper resembles
the one authors name ex post monopolization and focus on incentives for a relatively eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm
to vertically integrate and restrict output in the downstream market. In contrast to my approach, these
authors consider secret contract oﬀers made to downstream ﬁrms, and show that with deterministic costs,
two possible industry conﬁgurations are (i) vertical separation, and (ii) vertical integration that only involves
the eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm. In the latter, the integrated ﬁrm supplies its nonintegrated downstream rival,
but restricts its supplies as much as possible.4 However, as the authors argue, when the oﬀers are public,
(ii) may not be an equilibrium outcome. For example, at the extreme, when one of the upstream ﬁrms has
2inﬁnite marginal cost, the more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm has no incentive to merge with a downstream ﬁrm,
as it can exercise full market power even without integration.5 One contribution of the present paper is to
s h o wt h a ti nt h ep r e s e n c eo fn e t w o r ke x t e r n a l i t i e s ,w h e nquality of interconnection is a strategic variable, it
does not take too large an asymmetry to obtain this result. We can obtain the result within the range of
suﬃciently small installed base diﬀerences that preclude market cornering.
The model presented in this paper is potentially relevant to industries with network externalities in which
competing downstream ﬁrms choose their upstream network providers. Consider for example the competition
among Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) that do not own spectrum licenses and a network
infrastructure and rely on licensed Mobile Network Operators’ (MNO) networks to provide their mobile
services. Access of MVNOs to MNOs’ networks remains, by and large, unregulated6 in many countries, and
MNOs tend to provide connectivity to MVNOs on a voluntary basis. One reason why MNOs provide access
t oM V N O si st h a tt h el a t t e rt a r g e ts p e c i ﬁc niche markets (rather than mass markets) which MNOs have not
been able to reach and oﬀer substantially diﬀerentiated services compared to those oﬀered by the host MNO.
For example, some MVNOs which target teenagers provide advance applications that enable multi-player
games.7 Interconnection between MNOs is often subject to regulation, but the quality of interconnection is
in general more diﬃcult to verify and hence to regulate.
Another possible example is the Internet, where the interconnection structure is also hierarchical. Indi-
viduals and businesses sit at the bottom of the hierarchy, and connect their end-systems (PCs, workstations,
etc.) to local Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which are in turn connected to the Internet Backbone
Providers (or to regional ISPs) which are interconnected. The quality of the interconnection within the
backbone layer is determined in part by the choices made by the Internet Backbone Providers. Earlier
papers on connectivity in the Internet consider models where the quality of interconnection and the prices
for end-users are decided by the same agent (Crémer et al. [2000], Foros and Hansen [2001], Malueg and
Schwartz [2006]). In contrast to those analyses, this paper captures the multi-layered structure of the Inter-
net. On the other hand, the more competitive the upstream sector, the less suitable becomes the framework
of the present paper.
Finally, since the choice over the quality of interconnection is analogous to a choice over the degree of
3compatibility,8 the present analysis can apply more generally to vertical markets characterized by network
externalities. The compatibility incentives of ﬁrms in the presence of network externalities has been stud-
ied extensively in the literature. However, the question has not been addressed in a vertical setting where
compatibility decisions are made by upstream providers.9 For example, when individual users buy an Apple
notebook, they have no choice but to use Macintosh as the operating system (OS). On the other hand, those
that buy, for example, one of Sony’s SZ series notebooks, have no choice but to use Windows Vista as the OS
—although Microsoft and Sony are not vertically integrated. Therefore, end-users’ decision of which computer
to buy is tied another decision: which OS to use.10 Due to signiﬁcant network externalities, some of the
important determinants of the end-user’s decision on which notebook to buy include (i) computer manu-
facturers’ (downstream) choice of OS provider (upstream), (ii) the installed-bases of competing operating
systems, and (iii) the degree of compatibility between the operating systems.11
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present the model for a vertically separated
industry, and solve for the equilibrium. In Section 3, I introduce an initial stage to the game, where the
upstream networks sequentially decide whether or not to vertically integrate with one of the downstream
ﬁrms. After characterizing the equilibrium price and quality of interconnection for each subgame, i.e., for
each industry conﬁguration, I analyze incentives for vertical integration. Following the presentation of the
main results, I conclude with a discussion section.
2 Vertically Separated Industry
Upstream Networks In the stylized network structure represented in Figure 1, two upstream net-
works, U and U, with installed-bases  and , respectively, provide connectivity to the downstream
market. U has a larger installed-base,    ≥ 0.12
The quality of connectivity is denoted with . All users within the same upstream network enjoy perfect
connectivity (in-net =1 ). Unless both networks undertake investments in quality, the quality of intercon-
nection between networks is at a minimum, normalized to zero. Cost of investment in quality is deﬁned
as
 (oﬀ-net)=

2
oﬀ-net
2
 (1)
4Since oﬀ-net connectivity is a strategic choice variable, whereas in-net connectivity is not, for expositional
simplicity, I refer to oﬀ-net ∈ [01] as .13
Finally, upstream networks have a symmetric cost of providing unit connectivity, which is also normalized
to zero. They compete à-la Bertrand and charge  and , respectively, for unit connectivity to the
downstream ﬁrms.
Downstream Firms In the downstream market, two ﬁrms, D1 and D2, purchase connectivity from
one of the upstream networks and compete à-la Bertrand with diﬀerentiated services. They are located at
the extremities of a segment of length 1. I assume that D1 is located at 0, and D2 at 1.
[Figure 1 here]
End-users End-users are distributed uniformly with density 1 on the segment at whose extremities the
downstream ﬁrms are situated. Each end-user has a unit demand for connectivity that is provided by the
downstream ﬁrms. There are positive network externalities, and hence, an end-user’s utility depends on the
number of other users in the entire network. Parameter, ,w i t h ∈ (0b ) and b 1, captures the beneﬁt
of being connected to another customer. Since in-net connectivity is perfect, and since the quality of oﬀ-net
connectivity is set by the upstream networks, the end-users’ utility depends on both (i) their downstream
provider’s choice of the upstream network, and (ii) the rival provider’s choice of the upstream network.
The end-user located at  ∈ [01], who is connected to the network through the service provided by D,
which is in turn connected to the upstream network U,w i t h = , derives the following utility
 =  − | − | −  +
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
( +  + (− +( 1− ))) if D− connects to U−
( +  +( 1− )+−) if D− connects to U
(2)
where  stands for the location of D,  is the standard transportation cost,  and (1 − ) are the market
shares of D and D− respectively, and  is the connectivity price charged by D.T h eﬁxed utility derived
by connecting to any of the downstream ﬁrms, denoted by , is assumed to be suﬃciently large so that all
end-users buy service from one of the two downstream ﬁrms.
5Let  denote the installed-base diﬀerence between the upstream networks, i.e.,
 =  − ,( 3 )
and let
 ≡ (1 − )  b  (4)
We can interpret  as the large upstream network’s installed-base advantage. This is because for a given
positive installed-base diﬀerence (0), two upstream networks are perceived as completely identical from
the end-users point of view if
i. the quality of interconnection between the upstream networks is the same as the quality of on-net
connectivity ( =1 ), and/or
ii. there are no network externalities ( =0 ).
Either of the two conditions implies that the large network has no installed-base advantage in competition
(i.e.,  =0 ). For any given level of imperfect connectivity, and positive network externalities, a greater
magnitude of externalities and/or larger in installed-base diﬀerences imply a larger installed-base advantage.
Finally, for any given positive  and , the installed-base advantage is higher when connectivity is lower,
since a lower quality of connectivity increases the relative quality of service provided by the large upstream
network, compared to that of the smaller one.
Ia s s u m et h a t
( − ).( 5 )
This assumption limits the asymmetry in the size of the upstream networks, and assumes away “market
cornering”14 at the ﬁnal market. It implies
≥ .( 6 )
From now on, I normalize  =1for expositional simplicity.
Timing of the Game The game consists of four stages.
6Stage 1 — Each upstream network noncooperatively decides on the quality of interconnection, ,a n dt h e
eﬀective quality of interconnection is determined by the lowest of these two qualities, that is  =m i n{}.
Stage 2 — The upstream networks set the prices of unit connectivity,  and .
Stage 3 — The downstream ﬁrms choose their upstream network provider.
Stage 4 — The downstream ﬁrms set , compete for the end-users, and proﬁts are realized.
The Equilibrium in the Vertically Separated Industry
The main result of this subsection is Proposition 1, which shows that whenever the quality of interconnection
between the upstream networks is imperfect, the risk dominant equilibrium is characterized by both down-
stream ﬁrms connecting to the large upstream network, and the large network obtaining a positive proﬁt
margin that amounts to its installed-based advantage. Proposition 2 shows that in the vertically separated
industry, the equilibrium quality of interconnection between the upstream networks lies at the minimum.
The latter result is basically an extension of the interconnection degradation result in Crémer et al. (2000)
to a two-layered network structure. Before the formal proof, I present the intuition behind these results.
For all   , a higher quality of interconnection between the upstream networks is not only costly but
also leads to more intense price competition. At the one extreme, when quality of interconnection is the same
as the quality of in-net connectivity ( =1 ) two networks are equivalent from the viewpoint of the end-users
and competition drives prices to marginal cost. Therefore, by keeping the quality of oﬀ-net connectivity
inferior to its on-net quality (i.e., by not investing in the quality of interconnection), the large upstream
network preserves its quality advantage over the smaller network. When the quality of interconnection is
inferior to on-net connectivity, connecting to the smaller network becomes a riskier strategy, which enables
the large upstream network to supply connectivity to both downstream ﬁrms obtain a markup that reﬂects
its installed-base advantage.
Let  denote the diﬀerence between the unit price of connectivity charged by the upstream networks,
i.e.,
 =  − .( 7 )
7Lemma 1 For all  and 1, in the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame the two downstream
ﬁrms connect to the same upstream network.
Proof. Table 1 below summarizes the payoﬀs of the subgame where downstream ﬁrms choose their upstream
network provider, with 12 and  =0for  −3(1− ),a n d =( 3( 1− ) −  + )
2 18(1 − )
and  =( 3( 1− )+ − )
2 18(1 − ) for  ∈ [ − 3(1− )3(1− )+],a n d =0and 12
for 3(1− )+. The computation of the payoﬀs can be found in Appendix A.1.
[Table 1 here]
Let (U1,U2) denote the strategy proﬁle of the downstream ﬁrms, with the ﬁrst and second terms describing
D1’s and D2’s upstream network choice, respectively, with 12=.
The proof is straightforward for  − 3(1− ) and 3(1− )+,f o rw h i c h and  are
zero respectively. The unique Nash equilibrium is (U,U )f o r − 3(1− ) and is (U,U )f o r
3(1− )+. For all  ∈ [ − 3(1− )3(1− )+] we have both  and  positive. The two
downstream ﬁrms connect to diﬀerent upstream networks, only if both  and  are greater than 12.T h a t
is, if 3(1 − ) −  +   3
p
(1 − ) and if 3(1 − )+ −   3
p
(1 − ). Adding two inequalities yield
6(1 − )  6
p
(1 − ), and by inequality (6) this implies, 2  , which in turn implies 1 establishing
the contradiction. The two Nash equilibria are then (U,U )a n d( U ,U ).
Before I provide the intuition for Lemma 1, I brieﬂy discuss the case in which the quality of interconnection
between upstream networks is the same as the quality of on-net connectivity ( =1 ). In such a case if
the upstream networks charge the same price for connectivity, the downstream ﬁrms’ choice of upstream
network provider is irrelevant in terms of their potential market share, and hence their proﬁts. This is
because potential customers of each downstream ﬁrm would enjoy perfect connectivity in the entire network,
regardless of their choice of downstream provider. Therefore, when  =1 , there are four pure strategy Nash
equilibria, (U,U), (U,U), (U,U), and (U,U); and the downstream ﬁrms share the market equally
and obtain the same proﬁts under all equilibria. If the upstream networks charge diﬀerent prices, then the
equilibrium is unique; both downstream ﬁrms get connected to the upstream network which sets a lower
price for connectivity.
Lemma 1 shows that whenever the quality of interconnection is imperfect between the upstream networks
8(1)d o w n s t r e a mﬁrms always connect to the same upstream network providers. When  is suﬃciently
low, the dominant strategy for both downstream ﬁrms is to connect to U. Likewise, when  is suﬃciently
high, the dominant strategy for both downstream ﬁr m si st oc o n n e c tt oU . For intermediary values of ,f o r
which downstream ﬁrms obtain non-negative proﬁts regardless of their network choice, the situation displays
a coordination game with two Nash equilibria, (U,U)a n d( U ,U), in both of which the downstream
ﬁrms connect to the to same upstream network.
When the downstream ﬁrms connect to the same upstream network, the end-users of both downstream
ﬁrms enjoy the same quality of on-net connectivity and they pay the same price for the unit connectivity, and
hence, ﬁrms end up sharing the local market equally. Since the unit cost of connectivity is entirely borne
by the end-customers, both equilibria, (U,U)a n d( U ,U) ,y i e l ds a m ea n ds y m m e t r i cp r o ﬁts for the
downstream ﬁr m sr e g a r d l e s so f, and therefore, neither of the equilibrium payoﬀ-dominates the other. If
each ﬁrm connects to a diﬀerent upstream network, whenever the quality of interconnection is inferior to the
quality of on-net connectivity, the ﬁrm which is connected to the large upstream network has a competitive
advantage with respect to its rival. For suﬃciently low , this makes connecting to the small network a
riskier strategy.
I use the risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten (1988)15 as the equilibrium concept for this subgame in
which ﬁrms choose their network providers, and with the following Lemma, I state the conditions for each
of the two equilibria to constitute a risk dominant equilibrium.
Lemma 2 For all 1, in the subgame where the downstream ﬁrms choose their upstream networks,
(U,U) is a risk dominant equilibrium if   ,a n d( U ,U)i sar i s kd o m i n a n te q u i l i b r i u mi f  .
Proof. By the deﬁnition of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in this 2 × 2 symmetric game (U,U)i sar i s k
dominant equilibrium if and only if
1
2
µ
1
2
¶
+
1
2

1
2
 +
1
2
µ
1
2
¶
 (8)
which implies  . G i v e nt h ea s s u m p t i o ns t a t e di n( 5 ) ,t h i si n e q u a l i t yh o l d si fa n do n l yi f  
Similarly, one can show that (U,U) is a risk dominant equilibrium if and only if   .
9Risk dominance provides a very intuitive prediction in this game.16 T h e r ea r et w op u r es t r a t e g yN a s h
equilibria, and the players cannot predict which equilibrium their opponent will lean towards, as both
equilibria yield the same payoﬀ. Assume that 12  . Then by choosing to connect to U,a
downstream ﬁrm takes the risk of getting payoﬀ  which is the smallest payoﬀ in this game. However,
by connecting to U it guarantees itself a payoﬀ of at least . Therefore, provided that   , i.e.,
 ,c o n n e c t i n gt oU  is less risky than connecting to U in this subgame. The reverse is true if   .
Proposition 1 In the second stage of the game U sets  = ,a n dU  sets  =0 ,a n db o t hd o w n s t r e a m
ﬁrms connect to U
Proof. It is straightforward from the gross proﬁt functions of U and U.W eh a v e
Π =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 if  
0 if  
and Π =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 if  
0 if  
(9)
and Bertrand competition yields  =  and  =0 
The installed-base advantage of the large upstream network is analogous to a cost advantage in price
competition. The price of the small upstream network is driven to its marginal cost, whereas the large
upstream network holds a markup which amounts to its installed-base advantage, and covers the market
alone.17
Proposition 2 In the vertically separated industry, the equilibrium quality of interconnection is at the min-
imum.
Proof. It follows from U’s optimization problem,
max

½
(1 − ) −

2
2
¾
. (10)
U has no incentives to invest in quality of interconnection either, since it obtains no proﬁts in this market.
The equilibrium payoﬀs in the vertically separated industry are Π = , Π =0 ,a n dΠ1 = Π2 =1 2.
103 Vertical Integration
In this section I consider upstream networks deciding sequentially whether or not to integrate with one of
the downstream ﬁrms. I ﬁrst consider and present the case in which the large network moves ﬁrst, and then
I turn to the equilibrium where the small network moves ﬁrst. Whenever integration occurs I assume that
the integrated upstream network provides connectivity to its downstream subsidiary at marginal cost (zero).
I do not consider the case where the integrated upstream network can commit to charge a positive price to
its downstream subsidiary, as the internal price is not observable by the non-integrated downstream rival.18
Timing of the game: The game consists of six stages.
Stage 1 — U decides whether to integrate with one of the downstream ﬁrms (say D1)
Stage 2 — Following U’s decision, U decides on integration. If integration does not occur at Stage 1,
U decides whether to integrate with one of the downstream ﬁrms (say D2). If integration occurs at Stage
1, U decides whether to engage in counter-merger (with D2).
S t a g e s3t o6— These stages of the game are similar to Stages 1-4 that are presented in Section 2.
I assume that upstream networks decide to integrate with one of the downstream ﬁrms only if proﬁts
under integration is larger than the sum of proﬁts when there is no integration. Figure 2 depicts the extensive
form of the game tree with some abuse of presentation (of stages 3,4 and 6).
In this setting, there are four industry conﬁgurations (subgames):
(1) vertical separation,
(2) the small upstream network is integrated with one of the downstream ﬁrms (U —D 2),
(3) the large upstream network is integrated with one of the downstream ﬁrms (U —D 1), and
(4) two integrated networks.
[Figure 2 here]
11Equilibrium prices, connectivity level and proﬁts of subgame (1) are as in Section 2. For subgames (2)
and (3), in which there is one integrated ﬁrm, possible outcomes regarding the non-integrated downstream
ﬁrm’s choice of upstream provider (in Stage 5) are denoted with (2a)-(2c) for subgame (2), and with (3a)-(3c)
for subgame (3). For a given ,  and ,g r o s sp a y o ﬀso fD 1,D 2,U ,a n dU  that are realized after
the competition for end-users are denoted with Π
1Π
2Π
Π
, respectively, for each industry conﬁguration
 =(1),(2a),...,(4). Computations of the payoﬀs for all subgames can be found in Appendix A.1-A.4 and are
summarized in Appendix A.5.
3.1 The Equilibrium
Before I compute the equilibrium for subgames (2), (3), and (4), I rule out outcomes (2b) and (3b), in which
the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm exits the market when only one of the upstream network is integrated,
and I show that both integrated and non-integrated upstream networks are willing to supply connectivity to
the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm in both subgames (2) and (3).
Lemma 3 In subgames (2) and (3), where one of the upstream network integrates with a downstream ﬁrm,
there are no incentives for vertical foreclosure, and both upstream networks compete to provide connectivity
to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
In both subgames (2) and (3), the non-integrated upstream network has an incentive charge a non-
negative price and sell connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm, as it would obtain no proﬁts
otherwise. In turn, the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm can obtain a non-negative market share when the
price of connectivity is suﬃciently low. Therefore, in both cases (2b) and (3b); if the integrated ﬁrm refuses
to deal with the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm, or equivalently, charges too high a price to it, regardless
of which upstream network is integrated the rival upstream network is better oﬀ by selling connectivity to
the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm.
Note that this result hinges on assumption stated in inequality (5) that puts an upper bound on the
installed-base diﬀerence and rules-out market cornering. For very large installed-base diﬀerences such that
inequality (5) is violated, this may no longer be true as the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm may not be
12able to obtain a positive market share when it connects to the small upstream network unless the price of
connectivity is negative (i.e., unless the small network subsidizes it). This, in turn, may give incentives to the
large network to refuse to deal with the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm and to monopolize the downstream
market.
Given that the non-integrated upstream ﬁrm is willing to provide the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm
with connectivity, in both subgames (2) and (3), the integrated network also prefers to sell connectivity to
its downstream rival, and this is true for all installed-base diﬀerences that satisfy the inequality (5). Again,
if the installed-base diﬀerence is too high, this may no longer be true; in (2) the small integrated network
may choose not to compete with the large upstream network for that it may require lowering the price of
connectivity too much, and in (3) the large integrated network, which anticipates that its downstream rival
will exit, may refuse to deal.
I proceed with characterizing the equilibrium price and the quality of interconnection for each subgame.
Then, I move backwards and study incentives for vertical integration.
Subgame (4): Two integrated networks
Each vertically integrated upstream network provides connectivity to its own subsidiary at zero price, and
hence, double-marginalization is completely mitigated in this industry conﬁguration. For a given level of
quality of interconnection, the gross proﬁts are computed in Appendix A.4 and can be found below.
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1 =
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
(11)
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2 =
(3(1 − ) − )
2
18(1 − )
. (12)
When there are two integrated networks in the industry, the only source of proﬁts is the provision of service
to the end-users. Both downstream ﬁrms obtain positive markets shares, and hence positive proﬁts, for
any quality of interconnection. For any given 1, the integrated large network charges a higher price to
end-users (
(4)
1 
(4)
2 ) and obtains both a higher market share and higher proﬁt than the integrated small
network. The integrated large (small) upstream network’s price, market share, and proﬁts are (increasing)
13decreasing with the installed-base diﬀerence.
For any 1, this industry conﬁguration yields lower prices to end-consumers and a lower industry
proﬁts compared to the vertically separated industry; in which the large network exercises market power in
the downstream sector.
Quality of Interconnection Lemma 4 characterizes the equilibrium quality of interconnection in this
subgame.
Lemma 4 In subgame (4) the equilibrium quality of interconnection
(i) is determined by the large upstream network,
(ii) is decreasing with the size of the installed-base diﬀerence,
(iii) is positive for all  ≤ e  with
e  =
3(1− )
2 − 
a n di sz e r oo t h e r w i s e .
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
In this industry conﬁguration the equilibrium connectivity is determined by the preference of the large
upstream network. Gross proﬁts of the small integrated network is increasing with , whereas this is true
for the large network only for small installed-base diﬀerences. This is because while a high quality of
interconnectivity increases end-users’ willingness to pay for access to both of the networks, at the same
time it makes the large upstream network’s quality of service less diﬀerentiated from that of the small
network’s. Besides the investment in the quality of connectivity, this constitutes an additional cost to the
large network. While this cost is insigniﬁcant for small installed-base diﬀerences, for which the networks
are already less diﬀerentiated (albeit at a poor quality of interconnection), it becomes signiﬁcant with larger
asymmetries. Therefore, even in the absence of cost of investment, the large network does not invest in
quality of interconnection when the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently large.
Note that the treshold of installed-base diﬀerence, e , above which the large network’s gross proﬁts are
decreasing with connectivity is decreasing with the degree of network externalities. In the presence of a high
14degree of network externality, the large network prefers not to invest in quality of interconnection even if
the asymmetry in the installed bases is small, as in the absence of a high quality of interconnection, network
externalities further elevate the large network’s competitive advantage.
In this industry conﬁguration the connectivity incentives would be the highest if the networks had sym-
metric installed bases, in which case the equilibrium connectivity would be 2. Due to the cost of investment
in quality, the equilibrium quality of interconnection would be still inferior to the quality of on-net connectiv-
ity. However, a larger network externality would give higher incentives to the symmetric networks to invest
in it.
Subgame (3): U —D 1 integration
In this subgame, where the large upstream network is integrated with one of the downstream ﬁrms and
the small upstream network is not, the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm, D2, chooses its upstream network
provider. With Lemma 5, I show that D2 buys connectivity from the large upstream network, and ﬁnally,
with Lemma 6, I characterize the equilibrium quality of interconnection.
Lemma 5 In subgame (3), for any given 1, the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm buys connectivity from
the integrated network.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The equilibrium price at which the large upstream network sells connectivity to the non-integrated
downstream ﬁrm,

(3)
 =3− (3(1 − ) − )
p
1 −  (13)
is increasing, and hence its proﬁts are decreasing, with the installed-base diﬀerence. Although both down-
stream ﬁrms’ end-users experience the same in-net quality of connection, the non-integrated downstream
ﬁrm has a disadvantage in downstream competition. The presence of network externalities enhances the
large upstream network’s ability to raise its downstream rival’s cost. When there are positive network exter-
nalities, the integrated upstream network, even with no initial installed-base diﬀerence ( =0 ) can charge a
positive price, thanks to the potential customers of its subsidiary that adds to its installed-base.
15Note that for any 1,w eh a v e
(3)
 
(1)
 = , which is true even in the absence of any initial
installed-base diﬀerence. In contrast to a vertically separated industry, there is no coordination problem
between the downstream ﬁrms (in choosing an upstream network). Potential customers of the integrated
downstream ﬁrm further elevate the large upstream network’s installed-base advantage, which makes the
small upstream network even less attractive from the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm’s point of view. This
in turn, in the absence of perfect quality of interconnection, increases the ability of the large integrated
network to charge a high connectivity price to the rival non-integrated downstream ﬁrm and raise its cost.
Quality of Interconnection In this industry conﬁguration, neither of the networks has an incentive to
invest in quality of interconnection. The small upstream network obtains no proﬁts in this local market,
and hence, has no incentive to invest in quality of interconnection. The large upstream network prefers
minimum quality of interconnection, as its proﬁts are increasing with the connectivity price it can charge
to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm (given that the latter obtains non-negative proﬁts), and the max-
imum connectivity price it can charge to attract the non integrated ﬁrm is decreasing with the quality of
interconnection.
Lemma 6 In subgame (3) none of the upstream networks has an incentive to invest in the quality of inter-
connection, and hence, the equilibrium quality of interconnection is at the minimum.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
A high quality of interconnection reduces the competitive advantage of having a large installed-base, as
the ability of the large network to charge a positive markup to the non-integrated network depends on how
inferior the quality of interconnection is to the on-net quality of connectivity. By maintaining a poor quality
of connectivity the large upstream network diﬀerentiates its quality of service from that of U,a n di n c r e a s e s
the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm’s opportunity cost of buying connectivity from the small upstream
network. This increases , which in turn provides the subsidiary ﬁrm with a competitive advantage in
downstream competition.19
The equilibrium quality of interconnection in subgame (3) is the same as in subgame (1), and it is
strictly lower than that in subgame (4) for small installed-base diﬀerences, as the equilibrium quality of
16interconnection is positive in the latter.
Subgame (2): U —D 2 integration
In this subgame, where the small upstream network is integrated with one of the downstream ﬁrms, and
the large upstream network is not, the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm, D1, chooses its upstream network
provider. With the following Lemma I show that which upstream network sells access in equilibrium is
determined by the size of the installed-base diﬀerence, and with Lemma 8, I characterize the equilibrium
quality of interconnection.
It follows from Lemma 3 that in subgame (2), upstream networks compete for D1. Unlike subgame (3),
which upstream network ends up selling connectivity in equilibrium depends on the size of the installed-
base diﬀerence. This is because the small upstream network obtains additional installed-base through its
subsidiary, and hence, for a suﬃciently small initial installed-base diﬀerences it can have a competitive
advantage in providing connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm.
Lemma 7 In subgame (2), for any given 1, the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm buys connectivity from
the integrated upstream ﬁrm if  ≤ b ,w i t h
b  =
3
p
(1 − ) − 3(1 − )

,
and from the non-integrated ﬁrm otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
When the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently small the industry conﬁguration is characterized by
(2a), and by (2c) otherwise. For a given 1, when the network externalities are signiﬁcant, the integrated
network can not attract the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm unless the asymmetry in the installed-base is
suﬃciently small. A higher degree of externality implies a lower treshold of installed base diﬀerence, b ,
below which the integrated network sells connectivity to the non-integrated ﬁrm. Furthermore, for a given
level of externality, a higher quality of interconnection implies that the integrated network can attract the
nonintegrated downstream ﬁrm in the presence of higher installed base disadvantage. However, when the
17installed-base diﬀerence between the upstream networks is suﬃciently large, the small integrated upstream
network can not attract the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm with a non-negative price.
Quality of Interconnection In this subgame, for all installed-base diﬀerences, the large network has no
incentives to invest in quality of interconnection. Therefore, although the small network prefers a positive
quality of interconnection, the quality of interconnection is at the minimum in the equilibrium.
Lemma 8 In subgame (2) the equilibrium quality of interconnection is at the minimum.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
If  ≤ b , the large upstream network makes no proﬁts in this local market, and hence, has no incentives
to invest in quality of interconnection. Therefore, when the integrated network provides connectivity to
the entire local market, quality of interconnection between the upstream networks is at the minimum. The
large network has no incentives to invest in quality of connectivity if b  either. This is because when
the installed base diﬀerence is suﬃciently large, the non-integrated network buys connectivity from the large
network. In such a case, the gross proﬁt of the large network is decreasing with the quality of interconnection,
since the price it can charge to the nonintegrated network decreases with the quality of interconnection.
Therefore, regardless of , the quality of interconnection in this subgame is at the minimum.
3.2 Comparing Industry Conﬁgurations
Before I study the incentives for vertical integration and characterize the equilibrium industry structure, I
highlight the main diﬀerences in industry conﬁgurations (2), (3), and (4), which are depicted in Figure 3.
As noted earlier, the upstream networks’ choice of the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm in conﬁguration (2)
depends on the size of the installed-base diﬀerence; we have (2a) (i.e., D1 connects to U)i f ≤ b  and (2c)
otherwise.
[Figure 3 here]
Quality of interconnection All industry conﬁgurations except for (4) yield the minimum quality of
interconnection, zero. In the industry conﬁguration (3) neither of the upstream networks has an incentive
18to invest in quality of interconnection; the small network does not obtain any proﬁts in this market, and the
large network’s ability to raise its downstream rival’s cost decreases with the quality of interconnection. In
the industry conﬁgurations (2a) and (2b) the large upstream network has no incentive to invest in quality
of interconnection, but for diﬀerent reasons. In (2a), the initial installed base diﬀerence is suﬃciently small
( ≤ b ) so that the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm buys connectivity from the small integrated network, and
hence, the large upstream network obtains no proﬁts. In (2c), the large upstream network has a suﬃciently
large installed-base advantage, and sells connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm. It has no
incentive to invest in quality of interconnection since a higher quality mitigates the large upstream network’s
competitive advantage, and lowers the price it can charge the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm. In (4) both
upstream networks have an incentive to invest in quality of interconnection if the installed-base diﬀerence is
suﬃciently low ( ≤ e ); the large network has no incentive to do so otherwise (e ).
Connectivity Prices When there are two integrated networks, the internal connectivity prices equal
marginal cost, by assumption. We have

(2c)
 
(1)
 
(3)
 , (14)
which implies that connectivity prices are highest in the industry conﬁguration (3). The large network can
exercise greater market power when the industry is vertically separated than when there is one vertical
integration that involves the small upstream network, (2c). This is because, when the small upstream
network integrates with one of the downstream ﬁrms, unlike in (1) there is no coordination problem between
the downstream ﬁrms. This favors the small integrated ﬁrm, and restricts the ability of the large network
to charge a high connectivity price to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm. Finally, unless the installed-base
diﬀerence is too small, we also have 
(2a)
 
(1)
 . If the initial installed-base diﬀerence is too small, then
the small integrated upstream network (with its downstream subsidiary’s potential consumers added to its
installed-base) is eﬀectively not "small," and hence, the connectivity price it charges to the downstream ﬁrm
rival can exceed 
(1)
 (which is low due to the small installed-base diﬀerence).
19Prices for end-consumers For any installed-base diﬀerence, industry conﬁguration (4) yields the lowest
prices for end-consumers among all the conﬁgurations.20 When there is one integrated ﬁrm in the industry
(conﬁgurations (2) and (3)), a large asymmetry in the installed-bases hurts the non-integrated downstream
ﬁrm, regardless of which upstream ﬁrm is integrated. First, consider suﬃciently small installed-base diﬀer-
ences ( ≤ b ) such that (2) is characterized by (2a). We have

(4)
2 
(4)
1 
(2a)
2 
(3)
1 
(2a)
1 
(3)
2 . (15)
In both (2a) and (3) the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm (D1 and D2 respectively) has a competitive dis-
advantage, which is decreasing with the installed-base diﬀerence in (2a) and increasing with it in (3). Now,
consider larger installed-base diﬀerences ( ≤ b ) such that (2) is characterized by (2c). Then, we have

(2c)
2 
(2c)
1 
(3)
2 ,a n db o t h
(2c)
1 and (
(2c)
1 − 
(2c)
2 ) are increasing with the installed-base diﬀerence.
Last but not least, we have 
(3)
1 
(1)
1 only for very small values of , This is because in (3) double-
marginalization is mitigated, and except for very small values of  with which the large network has a very
poor ability to exercise market power in (1), the price charged by the integrated downstream ﬁrm is lower
than the prices in the vertically separated industry. We have 
(3)
2 
(1)
2 unless  is suﬃciently high, which
means that despite of the raising rival’s cost strategy the large network adopts in (3), prices for end users
in (1) are higher than that charged by the non-integrated rival in (3) when the installed-base diﬀerence is
suﬃciently large. This relates to the large network’s higher ability to exercise market power in a vertically
separated industry in the presence of larger asymmetries.
Industry Proﬁts Industry proﬁts in (1) are greater than in (4). Regardless of the possible outcomes in
(2), (2a) and (2c) that depend on the size of the installed-base diﬀerence, industry yields higher proﬁts in
(2) than in (4).
Interestingly, industry proﬁts in (3) are higher than those in (1) only if the installed-base diﬀerence is
suﬃciently small. This is also true for the vertical sum of proﬁts (i.e., we have Π
(3)
 +Π
(3)
1  Π
(1)
 +Π
(1)
1 only
if  is suﬃciently small), and as I show in the next subsection, this is why the industry conﬁguration (3)
does not appear in equilibrium. In what follows, in order to illuminate this point, I explain how downstream
20and upstream proﬁts change in (1) and (3) with respect to .
First, in (3), the integrated downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁts (as well as the industry proﬁts) are increasing
with , whereas in (1) they are independent of , furthermore, the former is greater than the latter for
all . Secondly, in (3) the large upstream network’s connectivity revenues are higher than in (1) only if
beta is suﬃciently small. To see why, consider  =0 . When there is no initial asymmetry in installed-
bases, regardless of the quality of interconnection, the upstream network cannot charge a positive price
for connectivity in (1), whereas this is not true in (3). In (3), in the absence of a perfect connectivity,
the vertically integrated upstream network can charge a positive price to the downstream rival, thanks
to its downstream subsidiary’s potential customers that create an installed-base advantage. Therefore, in
the presence of small installed-base diﬀerences, (3) yields higher upstream proﬁts than in (1) as the large
network cannot exercise much market power in (1). However, when  is suﬃciently high, (1) yields higher
upstream proﬁts compared to (3). In both (1) and (3), the the connectivity prices are increasing with ,
but unlike in (1), the large network obtains connectivity revenues only from the nonintegrated downstream
ﬁrm in (3). Furthermore, in contrast to (1), a higher  (which translates to a higher a connectivity price in
both conﬁgurations) leads to a lower market share for the non-integrated rival, which in turn implies that
upstream proﬁts are increasing with  at a decreasing rate. The ﬁrst and the second point together imply
that while the large upstream network beneﬁts from integration in terms of higher downstream proﬁts, when
 is large it is harmed in terms of lower upstream proﬁts. When  is suﬃciently high, the latter eﬀect
dominates the latter, and hence, (1) yields a larger sum of vertical proﬁts than (3). To put it diﬀerently,
the large network does not need to integrate to exercise a higher market power when  is suﬃciently large.
Note that this is true only if there are positive network externalities and if quality of interconnection is a
strategic variable. If the quality of interconnection were not a strategic variable, and was same as the quality
of on-net connectivity, (1) would not lead to a higher industry proﬁts for any installed-base diﬀerence.
3.3 Incentives for Vertical Integration
In this subsection I show that regardless of which upstream network moves ﬁrst to decide on integration, (4)
is the equilibrium industry conﬁguration for all  ≤ b . I begin by characterizing the equilibrium when the
21large upstream network moves ﬁrst.
Proposition 3 When the large upstream network moves ﬁrst, there are two integrated networks in the
industry if  ≤ b , and there is no integration otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
When the large network moves ﬁrst, and integrates, the best response of the small network is to respond
by a counter-merger. This is because if it does not integrate it obtains a zero proﬁt, and the non-integrated
downstream ﬁrm obtains low proﬁts as the integrated network raises its cost by setting a high connectivity
price. Therefore, a vertical integration between the small network and the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm
yields a higher proﬁt than the sum of their proﬁts when they remain separate.
When the large network moves ﬁrst, and does not integrate, the best response of the small network
depends on the size of the installed-base diﬀerence. The best response of the small network is to integrate
with one of the downstream ﬁrms if  ≤ b .T h i si sb e c a u s ew h e n ≤ b , subgame (2) is characterized by
(2a) in which the non-integrated network buys connectivity from the small integrated network, and hence
there is room for a proﬁtable integration, as the sum of vertical proﬁts is higher than those obtained in
(1). However, when b , the small network can not engage in a proﬁtable merger, as in this range of
installed-base diﬀerences, subgame (2) is characterized by (2c). On one hand, both in (1) and (2c) small
upstream network obtains a zero proﬁt. On the other hand, downstream ﬁrms share the market equally, and
obtain a proﬁt of 1/2 in (1), whereas the integrated small network’s subsidiary competes against the rival
downstream that is connected to the larger network in (2c). Therefore, given that there is no integration
in the industry, the small network can not engage in a proﬁtable merger if the installed-base diﬀerence is
suﬃciently high.
To summarize, when  ≤ b , the dominant strategy of the small network is to integrate, and when b 
it can engage in a proﬁtable merger only if the large network is already integrated. Given the small network’s
best response described above, the large network integrates if  ≤ b , and not otherwise. This is because,
when  ≤ b  if it does not integrate, it gets zero proﬁts, and the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm which
competes against the small integrated network’s subsidiary, obtains a low proﬁtc o m p a r e dt ow h a ti tw o u l d
obtain under (4). If b , and if the large network integrates, the industry conﬁguration is (4) as the small
22network responds with counter-merger. On the contrary, if it does not integrate, the industry conﬁguration
is (1) since the small network can not engage in a proﬁtable merger. Since the sum of the large network’s
and any of the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁts is higher in (1) than that of the integrated large network’s in (4),
the large network does not integrate.
Therefore, when the large network moves ﬁrst and decides for integration, there are two vertical mergers
if  ≤ b , and none otherwise. When there are two mergers, the equilibrium quality of connectivity is
decreasing with , and it is positive for all  ≤ e  and at a minimum for all  ∈
³
e b 
i
. In a vertically
separated industry the quality of interconnection is at a minimum.
As I show below, when the small upstream network moves ﬁrst, the equilibrium industry structure also
consists of two vertically integrated ﬁrms for  ≤ b  (as integration in this range of  is the dominant strategy
for the small network). The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium industry conﬁguration when
the small network is the ﬁrst-mover.
Proposition 4 When the small upstream network moves ﬁrst, if  ≤ b  there are two vertical mergers, if
 ∈
³
b 
´
there is only U—D2 merger, and if  ≥  there is no integration in the industry.
Proof. See Appendix B.8.
When the small network moves ﬁrst and integrates, the best response of the large network is to integrate
if  ≤ b , and not to integrate otherwise. The reasoning is similar to why the large network integrates for all
 ≤ b  when it moves ﬁrst.
When the small network moves ﬁrst and does not integrate, the large network integrates if  ,a n d
not otherwise (where b  ). This is because, as explained earlier, industry proﬁts in (3) are higher than
in (1) only for small installed-base diﬀerences. For larger installed-base diﬀerences, the large network can
exercise a large market power without engaging in vertical integration.
First consider an installed-base diﬀerence such that .S i n c e b  the small network anticipates
that the large network will integrate if it observes no integration, and it will not integrate if it observes one.
The former conﬁguration is (3), whereas the latter is (2c). In both cases there is no source of upstream
proﬁts for the small network. However, the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁts in (3) are strictly lower
than are in (2c), and hence, there is room for a proﬁtable merger. This implies that the small network
23vertically integrates whenever , and the large network responds with a counter merger only if  ≤ b .
Now consider  ≥ . Then, regardless of the small network’s integration decision, the large upstream
network does not integrate. As the small network can not engage in a proﬁtable merger (given that there
is no other merger) for b , it remains non-integrated. Therefore, for all  ≥  the equilibrium industry
conﬁguration is characterized by vertical separation.
An interesting result is that, not integrating is the dominant strategy for the large upstream network for
all  ≥ . While it is intuitive why this is true when the small network integrates, it is counter-intuitive
when the small network does not integrate. This is because, as we discussed earlier, when the installed-base
diﬀerence is suﬃciently large, as the large upstream network can exercise considerable market power without
integrating vertically. Higher proﬁts obtained by the downstream subsidiary do not compensate the loss in
connectivity revenues that is brought about vertical integration.
For all  ≥  (equilibrium is characterized by vertical separation regardless of which network moves ﬁrst)
prices for end consumers are higher than what one would obtain in the presence of a vertical merger that
involves the large network. For all  ≥ b  (equilibrium is characterized by vertical separation if large network
moves ﬁrst) prices are higher than what one would observe from the downstream subsidiary of the large
network, and depending on ,t h e yc a nb el o w e r( f o r low) or higher (for  high) than the price that would
be charged by the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm. This implies that in the presence of a large asymmetries,
the vertically separate industry structure is not necessarily pro-competitive and may yield higher prices for
end-consumers than what one would observe if the large network were integrated and raised its downstream
rival’s cost.
The most desirable industry structure for consumers is the one with two vertical mergers, which yield
lowest prices for end-consumers, and higher incentives to invest in quality of interconnection (at least in the
presence of small asymmetries). This outcome, however, appears in equilibrium when the industry performs
relatively well regardless of its conﬁguration, i.e., when the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently small.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
By way of conclusion, I now discuss informally some possible extensions to the framework.
24Endogenous installed-bases In this paper I have considered two upstream networks with given installed-
bases competing in a (new) local market. I assumed that the decisions in this local market, in particular
on the quality of interconnection, does not aﬀect initially installed customers. One way to interpret this is
as installed-base customers being locked in with prior contracts and there being suﬃciently high switching
costs that would prevent them moving from one network to another. Another way to think about this is to
interpret the investment decisions that are made for quality of interconnection as those concerning only the
new market. That is, given the initial quality of connectivity (set in other markets), networks decide how
much to invest in additional infrastructure that improves quality of interconnection in the market subject
to study. Zero quality of interconnection, with this regard, does not necessarily mean that the networks are
completely disconnected.
Now, instead, consider two upstream networks with no installed-bases that will compete in  local
markets. The present framework is not appropriate to study competition and incentives for quality of in-
terconnection in a setting, in which ﬁrms compete in  markets simultaneously. This is because, depending
on expectations of downstream ﬁrm in each market there can be multiple equilibria. However, given the
ﬁndings of this paper, one can make conjectures on a sequential-game setting. Assume that two upstream
networks compete in  =1 2 markets sequentially. Since there are no installed-bases prior to com-
petition ( =0 )i nt h eﬁrst market we can have either of the networks supplying connectivity downstream.
As long as upstream ﬁrms make simultaneous and public oﬀers, we have four pure strategy Nash equilibria,
(U,U), (U,U), (U,U), and (U,U) ,a n da l ly i e l dt h es a m ep a y o ﬀ to the downstream ﬁrms regard-
less of the quality of interconnection. The equilibria (U,U)a n d( U ,U) would create an asymmetry
in competition in the next market in line, which will amount to the size of the ﬁrst market. However, by
vertically integrating, each upstream ﬁrm can guarantee itself an installed-base that amounts to half of the
ﬁrst market. Therefore, vertical integration would be a dominant strategy for both upstream ﬁrms. The
equilibria (U,U)a n d( U ,U)w o u l dl e a v eﬁrms indiﬀerent in terms of integration decisions, and whether
integrated or not, upstream ﬁrms would compete in the next market in line with symmetric installed-bases.
This assumes, of course, that the upstream ﬁrms are completely symmetric and can not subsidize down-
stream market to build up installed-bases in the initial markets. Any asymmetry introduced in initial markets
25(e.g., by sponsored installed-base), would lead to two successive mergers in the preceding market, unless the
installed-base diﬀerence is exceeds b , in which case markets may sequentially tip towards the larger network,
which would remain non-integrated.
Multiple upstream/downstream ﬁrms Consider  networks upstream networks, with 1  2 ≥  ≥
,s u c ht h a t1 
P
6=1 .L e t  =  denote quality of interconnectivity between networks  and ,
with  =1 2,a n d 6= . Furthermore, for simplicity, assume that  =1for all  6=1 ,s ot h a t
large network’s rival networks are perfectly interconnected. 21 Also assume that there are  ≤  symmetric
downstream ﬁrms. Then, in a vertically separated industry there is a similar coordination game between 
downstream ﬁrms when they choose their upstream network, which is likely to yield the same outcome as
in this paper studied in Section 1: that is, by not investing in 1,w i t h =2 ,U 1 can exercise market
power that would be proportional to
³
1 −
P
6=1 
´
. However, the entire analysis for vertical integration
would now be diﬀerent, in particular if and if any of the downstream ﬁrm can integrate only with one
of the upstream network. Even if the number of downstream ﬁr m si st h es a m ea st h en u m b e ro fu p s t r e a m
networks, the ﬁndings of this paper would not hold, due to a potential free-riding problem in investments in
interconnectivity. Consider the case for example for  = , where there are  vertically integrated networks
(the industry conﬁguration that is analogous to (4) in this paper). If  =1for all  6=1 ,t h e ni t
is enough for one of the smaller network  to invest in 1 (provided that U1 is also willing to invest) to
have a higher quality of interconnection among all  networks. Unless there are enforceable contracts that
allow for side-payments, under-investment in quality of interconnection can rise as an issue. Consider also
the conﬁguration that is analogous to (3), in which only the large network is integrated. Then, potential
competition upstream would give incentives to the large network to supply unintegrated networks, but unless
the connectivity among the smaller rival networks is perfect, it would increase the ability of the large network
to increase non-integrated rivals’ cost (and for  =1 ,w i t h 6=1the ﬁndings of this paper for (3) would
apply).
Now consider 1 ≥ 2 ≥  ≥ , but without any restrictions on how large the largest network is. Then,
almost anything can happen. Any subgame of the larger game that determines the equilibrium industry
conﬁguration is likely to involve multiple equilibria, which makes it hard to make any predictions.
26Large asymmetries in installed-bases The assumption which rules-out market cornering (inequality
(5)) is a crucial assumption for the analysis provided above. When it is violated, that is when the installed-
base diﬀerence between the upstream networks is too large, than vertical foreclosure followed by vertical
integration of the large network can be an equilibrium outcome. When the installed-base diﬀerence is too
large, then, the small network may not be able to engage in a proﬁtable counter-merger. Furthermore, it
may not be able to make the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm a proﬁtable oﬀer for connectivity (and hence,
there would be no potential competition upstream either) which may ultimately lead to vertical foreclosure.
However, when the installed-base diﬀerence is substantially high, the large network could also generate
monopoly proﬁts in the vertically separated structure.
Costly quality degradation I have assumed that quality of interconnection between the networks is
inferior to that of on-net connectivity, unless the networks undertake costly investments. One could also
assume that the on-net and oﬀ-net quality of connectivity is identical, unless ﬁrms engage in strategic
quality degradation. Assuming a costly quality degradation (e.g., regulatory costs) does not change the
qualitative nature of the results. The equilibrium industry conﬁguration is characterized by two vertical
mergers if the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently small, and by vertical separation if otherwise. When
the equilibrium is characterized by two vertical mergers, the quality of interconnection is perfect, and it yields
the highest quality of interconnection among other conﬁgurations. Industry conﬁguration (3) which is never
an equilibrium outcome, yields strictly lower quality of interconnection than (4). In both (1) and (3), the
equilibrium quality of interconnection is determined by the large network, and is decreasing with the size of
the installed-base diﬀerence. Diﬀerent than the present setting, the small network’s preferences determines
the quality of interconnection in (2) for suﬃciently small installed-base diﬀerences (so that the conﬁguration
is characterized by (2a)). In such a case the large network that sells no connectivity, has no incentives to
engage in costly degradation, whereas the small network may ﬁnd it proﬁt a b l et od os o .H o w e v e r ,( 2 )d o e s
not appear as an equilibrium conﬁguration.
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29Notes
1In the presence of network externalities, a similar coordination problem raises also in the absence of an
intermediary layer in competition, where end-users decide which network to join in. See for example, Church
and Gandal (2006) for platform competition in telecommunications; end-users may be reluctant to subscribe
a network with small installed-base as the initial size of the network may aﬀect their expectations on how
the network will grow. In contrast with the coordination problem in (a single-layered) platform competition,
the coordination problem present in this setting does not involve end-users, but the downstream ﬁrms that
choose their upstream networks. Furthermore, the key expectation in the coordination problem is the rival
ﬁrm’s choice of upstream network.
2See, for example, Rey and Tirole (2007) who consider Cournot competition and secret oﬀers, and show
that in the presence of a relatively ineﬃcient supplier, downstream ﬁrms end up buying inputs from the
eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm.
3See also Riordan (1998); in an asymmetric market where the dominant downstream ﬁrm considers a
backward integration vertical integration is anticompetitive, in that it increases both input and output
prices.
4See also White (2007); when there is incomplete information on the upstream ﬁrm’s cost, in contrast
with a vertically separated structure, vertical integration by a high-cost ﬁrm does not involve costly signaling
eﬀorts and hence, may be socially beneﬁcial.
5See Riordan (2005) for an extensive review of competitive eﬀects of vertical integration.
6Norway is an exception. In France the national regulator’s attempt to regulate access was rejected by
the European Commission.
7The setting is not a good ﬁt for those VMNO business models that entail merely resale agreements.
8Katz and Shapiro (1985) is one of the most inﬂuential papers in the general literature on compatibility
in the presence of network externalities. See also Farrell and Saloner (1986), (1992), Economides and White
(1994), and Economides (1996). An overview of this literature is provided by Liebowitz and Margolis (2002),
Farrell and Klemperer (2002).
9The framework that is provided in this paper is diﬀerent than "systems competition" where end con-
30sumers make the purchase decisions for each of the complementary component that makes a system. For ex-
ample, Church and Gandal (2000) look at how vertical mergers and foreclosure in systems markets (hardware-
software), aﬀect incentives to produce compatible components to the rival systems, where consumers decide
both for their hardware and software purchases, and there are no direct network externalities. See also
Economides and Salop (1992), where authors assume full compatibility and analyze vertical integration in
network markets.
10See Kretschmer (2004) for a review of the PC OS industry.
11There are potentially other reasons why the smaller network, Appe/Macintosh, is an integrated network
that excludes other computer manufacturers (e.g., control on quality), that my framework does not address.
My model also excludes the possibility of one network investing in one-way compatibility (e.g., Paralells
Desktop by Mac developed by Apple runs Windows applications). In the absence of those factors, my model
would predict an open system (possibly a vertically separated one) where Mac OS would be available to
other downstream ﬁrms.
12The focus of the paper is a local market, and the installed bases of the networks (customers in other
markets) are exogenous.
13Note that, the lower bound of , which is normalized to zero reﬂects minimum quality of interconnection
between the networks that is achieved in the absence of any additional investments in quality that are
undertaken by the networks. In some instances (i.e., no prior investments in quality of interconnection), it
may correspond to no connectivity.
14Market cornering happens, for example, when the downstream ﬁrms connect to diﬀerent upstream
networks that charge the same price , and all end-users subscribe to the downstream ﬁrm which is connected
to the large network.
15In a symmetric 2×2 game risk dominant equilibrium is deﬁned by the proﬁle where both players playing
their risk dominant strategy in which they strictly prefer the same action when they predict that their
opponent randomizes 1
2 − 1
2
16However, when advantage from the installed base, ,i sv e r ys m a l l( w h e n(−) → 0), risk dominance
may not provide a very good prediction.
3117Here, networks make their price oﬀers publicly and simultaneously. These results do not hold when
sequential contracting is allowed. In particular, commitment of any of the downstream ﬁrms to buy connec-
t i v i t yf r o m ,s a y ,t h eU , would result with a higher unit price oﬀered by the U to the next downstream
ﬁrm in line.
18Otherwise, with vertical integration ﬁrms can always replicate the no vertical integration outcome.
19When no connectivity occurs, similar to the eﬀect of exclusive dealing in Mathewson and Winter (1987),
the large upstream network eliminates the rival upstream ﬁrm from the market, and potential competition
replaces actual competition (in that the large upstream network can not charge a too high price to the
non-integrated downstream ﬁrm).
20Equilibrium prices for subgames (1)-(4) are computed as in Appendix A.1-4, by replacing relevant
equilibrium connectivity prices and quality of interconnection, and a summary table can be found in Appendix
A.6.
21For example, Malueg and Schwartz (2006) analyze interconnectivity incentives of a large network in a
single-layered structure, and assume that small rivals of the large network is perfectly interconnected Note,
however, this assumption is hard to impose, in particular, when quality of interconnection is costly.
32Appendix
A Computation of payoﬀsf o rag i v e n, ,a n d.
A.1 Subgame (1) Vertical Separation
In this section I compute the proﬁts of the downstream ﬁrms when there is no vertical integration. There
are four possible cases regarding the upstream network choice of the downstream ﬁrms.
(1a) D1 and D2 connect to U
This case yields perfect connectivity between the downstream ﬁrms. The utility to the end user at location
 from having access to the end-service is
 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 − | − 0| +  ( + 1 +( 1− 1)+) − 1 if connects to D1
 − |1 − | +  ( + 1 +( 1− 1)+) − 2 if connects to D2
(A.1a)
The marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between connecting to D1 and D2 satisﬁes −−1 = −1+−2
Therefore, D1 has a market share of  =1 2+( 2 − 1)2 and its proﬁti s(1 − )(12+( 2 − 1)2)
Similarly D2 has a market share of (1−)=1 2−(2 −1)2,a n di t sp r o ﬁti s(2−)(12−(2 −1)2)
The Nash equilibrium of the subgame yields 1 = 2 =  +1 , which implies Π
(1a)
 = , Π
(1a)
 =0 ,a n d
Π
(1a)
1 = Π
(1a)
2 = 1
2.
(1b) D1 connects to U and D2 connects to U
The utility to the end user at location  from having access to the end-service is
 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 − | − 0| +  ( + 1 + ( +( 1− 1))) − 1 if connects to D1
 − |1 − | +  (( + 1)+ +( 1− 1)) − 2 if connects to D2
(A.1b)
33The marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between connecting to D1 and D2 satisﬁes
− +  + +  + (1 − ) − 1 = −1+ +  + +  + (1 − ) − 2
D1 has a market share of
 =
1
2
+

2(1− )
+
2 − 1
2(1− )

Proﬁts of D1 and D2 are
Π
(1b)
1 =( 1 − )
µ
1
2
+

2(1 − )
+
2 − 1
2(1 − )
¶

and
Π
(1b)
2 =( 2 − )
µ
1
2
−

2(1 − )
+
1 − 2
2(1 − )
¶

respectively. For all  ∈ [ − 3(1− )3(1− )+], the Nash equilibrium of the subgame yields 1 =
(1 − )+( 2  + )3+3 and 2 =( 1− )+( 2  + )3 − 3 which implies
Π
(1b)
1 =
(3(1 − ) −  + )
2
18(1 − )
and
Π
(1b)
2 =
(3(1 − )+ − )
2
18(1 − )

(1c) D1 connects to U and D2 connects to U
Similar to (1b), for all  ∈ [ − 3(1− )3(1− )+] proﬁts of D1 and D2,a r e
Π
(1c)
1 =
(3(1 − )+ − )
2
18(1 − )

and
Π
(1c)
2 =
(3(1 − ) −  + )
2
18(1 − )

respectively.
34(1d) D1 and D2 connects to U
This case yields perfect connectivity between the downstream ﬁrms. The utility of the end user at location
 from having access to the end-service is
 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 − | − 0| +  ( + 1 +( 1− 1)+) − 1 if connects to D1
 − |1 − | +  ( + 1 +( 1− 1)+) − 2 if connects to D2
(A.1d)
Similar to (1a) we have 1 = 2 =  +1 , which implies Π
(1d)
 =0 , Π
(1d)
 = ,a n dΠ
(1d)
1 = Π
(1d)
2 = 1
2
A.2 Subgame (2) U integrates with D2
(2a) D1 connects to U
The utility to the end user at location  from having access to the end-service is deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n
(A.1d). The Nash equilibrium of the subgame is computed similarly, except that the U charges zero price
to D2, and charges  to D1. Equilibrium prices are 
(2a)
2 =1+3 and 
(2a)
1 =1+2 3,w h i c h
implies for all  ∈ [03], Π
(2a)
 =0(as U sells no connectivity in this market), Π
(2a)
 =( 3− )6,
Π
(2a)
1 =( 3−)218, Π
(2a)
2 =( 3+)218. The integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁti sc o m p o s e do fΠ
(2a)
2 and the proﬁt
obtained by selling connectivity to D1, hence it obtains
Π
(2a)
 ()+Π
(2a)
2 ()=
(3 + )2
18
+
(3 − )
6
.
(2b) D1 exits
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hU  does not sell connectivity (either charges too high a price, or refuses to supply)
to D1,a n dD 1 gains a negative market share if it buys connectivity from U In this case, D1 withdraws
from the market, and the integrated upstream network becomes a monopolist in the downstream market.
Therefore, Π
(2a)
1 =0 , Π
(2a)
 =0 , and the integrated upstream network obtains monopoly proﬁts denoted
with Π
(2a)
 + Π
(2a)
2 = Π()  0,w h e r eΠ()  0 is increasing in all its arguments.
35(2c) D1 connects to U
The utility of the end user at location  from having access to the end-service is deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n
(A.1b). The Nash equilibrium of the subgame is computed similarly, except that the U charges zero
price to D2,a n dU  charges  to D1. Equilibrium prices are 
(2c)
1 =( 3 ( 1 − )+ +2 )3 and

(2c)
2 =( 3 ( 1− ) −  + )3, which implies that for all  ∈ [03(1 − )+],
Π
(2c)
 ()=
µ
3(1 − )+ − 
6(1 − )
¶

Π
(2c)
 =0 
Π
(2c)
1 ()=
(3(1 − )+ − )
2
18(1 − )

and
Π
(2c)
2 ()=
(3(1 − ) −  + )
2
18(1 − )

A.3 Subgame (3) U integrates with D1
(3a) D2 connects to U
The utility to the end user at location  from having access to the end-service is deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n
(A.1b). The Nash equilibrium of the subgame is computed similarly, except that the U charges zero price
to D1,a n dU  charges  to D2. Equilibrium prices are 
(3a)
1 =( 3 ( 1 − )+ + )3 and 
(3a)
2 =
(3(1 − ) −  +2 )3, which implies that for all  ∈ [03(1 − ) − ],
Π
(3a)
 =0 
Π
(3a)
 ()=
µ
3(1 − ) −  − 
6(1 − )
¶

Π
(3a)
1 ()=
(3(1 − )+ + )
2
18(1 − )

36and
Π
(3a)
2 ()=
(3(1 − ) −  − )
2
18(1 − )

(3b) D2 exits
Consider the case in which U does not sell connectivity (either charges a too high price, or refuses to supply)
to D2,a n dD 2 gains a negative market share if it buys connectivity from U In this case, D2 withdraws
from the market, and the integrated downstream ﬁrm becomes a monopolist in the downstream market.
Therefore, Π
(3b)
 =0(as U sells no connectivity in this market), Π
(3b)
2 =0 , and the integrated upstream
network obtains monopoly proﬁts denoted with Π
(3b)
1 + Π
(3b)
 = Π(),w h e r eΠ()  0 and is
increasing in all its arguments.
(3c) D2 connects to U
The utility to the end user at location  from having access to the end-service is as in equation (A.1a).
The Nash equilibrium of the subgame is computed similarly, except that the U charges zero price to D1,
and charges  to D2. Equilibrium prices are 
(3c)
1 =1+3 and 
(3c)
2 =1+2 3, which implies
Π
(3c)
 ()=( 3− )6, Π
(3c)
 =0 , Π
(3c)
1 ()=( 3+)218,a n dΠ
(3c)
2 ()=( 3− )218 for all
 ∈ [03] for  ≤ 3 The integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁti sc o m p o s e do fΠ
(3c)
1 and the proﬁt obtained by selling
connectivity to D2, hence it obtains
Π
(3c)
 ()+Π
(3c)
1 ()=
(3 + )2
18
+
(3 − )
6
.
A.4 Subgame (4) Two vertically integrated networks
The utility to the end user at location  from having access to the end-service is deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n( A . 1 b ) .
The Nash equilibrium of the subgame is computed similarly, except that the U charges zero price to D1,a n d
U charges zero price to D2. Equilibrium prices are 
(4)
1 =( 3 ( 1− )+)3 and 
(4)
2 =( 3 ( 1− ) − )3,
which implies hat gross proﬁts are Π
(4)
 =0 , Π
(4)
 =0 ,
Π
(4)
1 =
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )

37and
Π
(4)
2 =
(3(1 − ) − )
2
18(1 − )

A.5 Summary of gross payoﬀsf o rag i v e n,  and 
[Table 2 here]
A.6 Summary of the equilibrium prices for each subgame
[Table 3 here]
(*) Prices for e .F o r ≤ e ,t e r m should be replaced by  (1 − ).
B P r o o f so fL e m m a sa n dP r o p o s i t i o n s
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3 .
I ﬁrst show that in subgames (2) and (3), the non-integrated upstream network is willing to provide
connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm. Then, I show that this is also true for the integrated
upstream network.
In subgame (2) we have Π
(2c)
  Π
(2b)
 =0for  ∈ (03(1− )+) and in subgame (3) we have
Π
(3a)
  Π
(3b)
 =0for  ∈ (03(1− ) − ), which implies that given the integrated upstream network
refuses to deal with the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm, the non-integrated upstream network is strictly
better oﬀ by selling connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm.
I proceed by showing that in subgame (2), the integrated upstream network, U, strictly prefers selling
connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm, i.e., if Π
(2a)
 + Π
(2a)
2  Π
(2c)
 + Π
(2c)
2 . Under imperfect
connectivity (0), for a given  ∈ [03) and a given  ∈ [03(1 − )+) (so that D1 obtains a
positive market share when it buys connectivity from any of the upstream networks) D1 buys connectivity
from U if Π
(2c)
1 () ≥ Π
(2a)
1 (),t h a ti s ,i f
 ≤ 3(1 − )+ − (3 − )
p
(1 − ) (B.1)
38and buys from U if otherwise. When D1 buys connectivity from U the integrated upstream network
obtains
Π
(2c)
 + Π
(2c)
2 =0+
(3(1 − ) −  + )
2
18(1 − )

which is increasing with . Given the constraint deﬁned with inequality (B.1), the maximum level of proﬁts
the integrated ﬁrm can obtain under (2c) is found by replacing  =3 ( 1−)+ −(3 − )
p
(1 − ) in
Π
(2c)
 + Π
(2c)
2 ,a n di s
³
6(1− ) −
p
(1 − )(3− )
´2
18(1 − )

When  is suﬃciently high (inequality (B.1) holds in the opposite direction) so that the integrated upstream
network sells connectivity to D1, and it obtains
Π
(2a)
 + Π
(2a)
2 =
(3 + )
2
18
+
(3 − )
2
6

One can verify that for all  ∈ (03),w eh a v e
(3 + )
2
18
+
(3 − )
2
6
 
³
6(1− ) −
p
(1 − )(3− )
´2
18(1 − )

since it simpliﬁes to
2 −
1
6
(3 − )
¡
2
 − 3 +4
¢
+
2
3
p
(1 − )(3− )  0
w h i c ht h i si st r u ef o r ∈ (01) and  ∈ (03). This concludes that the integrated small upstream network
prefers to sell connectivity to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm.
Finally, I show that in subgame (3), the integrated upstream network, U,i sb e t t e ro ﬀ by selling con-
nectivity to D2 at a price such that D2 buys connectivity from it. D2 buys connectivity from U if (i)
Π
(3a)
2 () ≤ Π
(3c)
2 (), i.e., if
63 −
(3(1 − ) −  − )
√
1 − 
 (B.2)
39and if (ii) it obtains non-negative proﬁts by doing so, i.e., if  ∈ [03). For all  ∈ (03(1 − ) − ) we
have the second term of the right-hand side of the inequality (B.2) positive, and hence, (i) implies (ii). It is
easy to verify that U’s proﬁts under (3c) are increasing with  for all  ∈ (03) (since the unconstrained
maximization problem yields ∗
 =3 75). This, in turn, implies that optimal price is the highest price
that satisﬁes inequality (B.2). Given  ∈ (03(1 − ) − ),w h e nU  charges the optimal price, we have
Π
(3c)
 + Π
(3c)
1  Π
(3a)
 + Π
(3a)
1 for all  ∈ (0(1 − )], which concludes that in subgame (3) U is better oﬀ
by selling connectivity to D2 than by refusing to deal.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4. (i) It suﬃces to compare 
³
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2
´
 and 
³
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1
´
,s i n c e
the cost function for quality of interconnection is same for both ﬁrms. We have 
³
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2
´
 

³
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1
´
 if 12 (1 − (1 − ))
2  0, which is true for all , ,a n d. It is also straightfor-
ward to show that Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1  Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2 , for all . Replacing for gross proﬁts, and simplifying yields
(1 − )(1−  (1 − ))  0, which is true for all .
(ii) The sign of 
³

³
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1
´

´
 is the same as the sign of
3 (1 − )(2+ − ) − (1 − )(2+ − ) − 3
which is decreasing with  and is negative for  =0for all 1. Therefore, we have 
³

³
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1
´

´
 
0 for all ,a n d1. Since cost of connectivity is independent of , this concludes that the optimal quality
of connection is decreasing with .
(iii) Connectivity is determined by U’s preferences. We have 
³
Π
(4)
 − 
22
´
 decreasing with beta,
and

¡
Π − 
22
¢

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=0
=0
for  =3( 1− )(2 − ). Therefore, the optimal quality of connectivity is minimum for all

3(1− )
2 − 
≡ e 
and is positive for all  ≤ e .
40Equilibrium Payoﬀsa r e
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1 =
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
and
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2 =
(3(1 − ) − )
2
18(1 − )
for For e ,a n d
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1 =
(3(1 −  (1 − )) +  (1 − ))
2
18(1 −  (1 − ))
−

2
2
and
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2 =
(3(1 −  (1 − )) −  (1 − ))
2
18(1 −  (1 − ))
−

2
2
For  ≤ e .
B.3 Proof of Lemma 5. It is straightforward to conclude that price competition ends with 
(3)
 =
3−(3(1 − ) − )
√
1 −  and 
(3)
 =0  since 
(3)
 is the optimal price for U and is strictly positive for
all  ∈ (01] (i.e., for all  ∈ [01)). Finally, D2 buys connectivity from U since 
(3)
 and 
(3)
 satisfy the
constraint deﬁned in inequality (B.2) (see Proof of Lemma 3) with equality.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 6. Gross proﬁts of the large network is
(3 + )2
18
+
(3 − )
6
,
which is increasing for all   375. Note that for any  ≥ 3, the non-integrated ﬁrm gets non positive
proﬁts if it buys connectivity from the large network. We have

(3)


=
(2 − 3 − +3 )
2
¡√
1 − 
¢
(1 − )
 0.
Therefore re, 
(3)
 increasing with , and hence decreasing with , which implies that the gross proﬁts of the
large network is decreasing with . Since quality of interconnection is costly, this also concludes that the net
proﬁts of the large network is decreasing with .
41B.5 Proof of Lemma 7. Lemma ?? shows that in this subgame the upstream networks compete for
providing access to the non-integrated downstream ﬁrm. Problem of U is deﬁned as follows.
maxΠ
(2a)
 + Π
(2a)
2 =m a x
µ
(3 + )2
18
+
(3 − )
6

¶
subject to  ≤ 3 and Π
(2a)
1 () ≥ Π
(2c)
1 ().T h eﬁrst constraint ensures a non-negative market share
for D1 when it buys access from U, and the second constraint ensures that D1 prefers buying access from
U instead of U. The second constraint can be rewritten as
(3 − )2
18
≥
(3(1 − )+ − )
2
18(1 − )
for all  ∈ [03] and  ∈ [03(1 − )+], and can be simpliﬁed to
 ≤ 3 −
3(1 − )+ −  p
(1 − )
≡ 
First assume that the installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently small so that price competition between the
upstream networks derives prices to  =0and  ≥ 0 (upstream ﬁrms are competing in prices, and
hence, when either of the upstream ﬁrm is selling connectivity to D1, the other upstream ﬁrm must be
charging a zero price at the equilibrium, so there are no unilateral incentives to deviate), and U sells access
to D1 (i.e., industry conﬁguration is (2a)). The second-order condition is satisﬁed as −29  0,a n dt h e
unconstrained optimal price deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition is 375. Since the unconstrained optimal
price is higher than both constraints, and since we have   3 for  =0 , 
(2a)
 is deﬁned by the highest
price that satisﬁes  ≤ ; i.e.,

(2a)
 =3−
3(1 − )+
p
(1 − )
When (2a) is the equilibrium industry conﬁguration, U can not attract D1 with a non-negative price, and
(2a) is the equilibrium industry conﬁguration if 
(2a)
 is non-negative, that is, if
 ≤
3
p
(1 − ) − 3(1 − )

.
42Second, assume that installed-base diﬀerence is suﬃciently large so that U can not attract D1 with a non-
negative price. Then price competition derives  =0and  ≥ 0,a n dU  sells access to D1 (the industry
conﬁguration is (2)). Problem of U is deﬁned as follows.
maxΠ
(2c)
 =m a x
µ
3(1 − )+ − 
6(1 − )
¶

subject to  ≤ 3(1 − )+ and Π
(2c)
1 ()  Π
(2a)
1 ().T h e ﬁrst constraint ensures a non-negative
market share for D1 when it buys access from U, and the second constraint ensures that D1 prefers buying
access from U instead of U. The second constraint can be rewritten as
(3(1 − )+ − )
2
18(1 − )

1
2
for  =0 , and can be simpliﬁed to
 ≤ 3(1 − )+ − 3
p
(1 − ) ≡ 
First-order condition to U’s problem is
Π
(2c)


=

6 − 6
+
1
6 − 6
(3 − +  − 3) = 0,
and the second-order condition is satisﬁed as 13 − 3  0. Therefore, the unconstrained optimum yields
e  =
3(1− )+
2
S i n c ew eh a v ee  ∈ [03(1 − )+], it remains to verify whether b  ≤ ,t h a ti s ,i f
(3 − 3 + )
2
≤ 3(1 − )+ − 3
p
(1 − )
43which can be rewritten as

6
√
1 −  − 3(1− )

Below, I show that this inequality does not hold for any (1 − ). Multiplying and diving the right
hand side of this inequality with (1 − ) yields (1 −  − ). It remains to show that
6
√
1 −  − 3(1− )


1 −  − 

which can be rewritten as
6
p
1 −  (1 − ) − 4(1−  (1 − )) − 0
and which is always true for  ∈ [01] and  ∈ [01]. Therefore, the constraint is binding at the optimum,
and the optimal access price under this industry conﬁguration, 
(2c)
 is deﬁned by the maximum price that
satisﬁes  ≤ , i.e.,

(2c)
 =3 ( 1− )+ − 3
p
(1 − )
(2c) is the equilibrium industry conﬁguration if 
(2c)
 ≥ 0,t h a ti si f
3(1 − )+ − 3
p
(1 − ) ≥ 0

3
p
(1 − ) − 3(1 − )

= b 
To summarize; given that U integrates with D2,i f ≤ b , and the equilibrium industry conﬁguration is
characterized with (2a), where D1 buys connectivity from U. The equilibrium connectivity prices and
proﬁts are 
(2a)
 =3− (3(1 − )+)
p
(1 − ), 
(2a)
 =0 , Π
(2a)
 =0 ,
Π
(2a)
1 =
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
Π
(2a)
2 =
³
6
p
(1 − ) − 3(1 − ) − 
´2
18(1 − )
44Π
(2a)
 =
¡
3 − +3
√
1 −  − 3
¢
(− 3 +3 )
6(1 − )
If b , the equilibrium industry conﬁguration is characterized with (2c), where D1 buys connectivity from
U, and the equilibrium connectivity prices and proﬁts are 
(2c)
 =3 ( 1− )+ − 3
p
(1 − ), 
(2c)
 =0 ,
Π
(2c)
1 =1 2, Π
(2c)
 =0 ,
Π
(2c)
 =
¡
3 − 3 + − 3
√
1 − 
¢¡√
1 − 
¢
2(1− )
Π
(2c)
2 =
¡
2 − 2 −
√
1 − 
¢2
2(1− )
B.6 Proof of Lemma 8. The proof is straightforward for  ≤ b , since at this range we have Π
(2c)
 =0 ,
and hence U has no incentives to invest in quality of connection. Forb  we have net proﬁts (as well as
gross proﬁts) of U decreasing with .A sw eh a v e
2
³
Π
(2c)
 − 
22
´

= −
( −  +2 )
4
¡√
 −  +1
¢
( −  +1 )
 0,
and

³
Π
(2c)
 − 
22
´

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= 
=
¡
3 − 4 +  +4 
2 − 8
2 +4 
3 +6
√
 −  +1− 6
¢
4( −  +1 )( 1− )
 0,
for all 0, which implies that

³
Π
(2c)
 − 
22
´

 0
for all  and 0. This argument applies also to gross proﬁts, since the cost of connectivity is independent
of .
B.7 Proof of Proposition 3. I begin with studying best response of U.G i v e nt h a tU  integrates, the
industry conﬁguration is (4) if U integrates, and it is (3) if it does not. Therefore, a counter-merger occurs
if
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
2 ≥ Π
(3)
 + Π
(3)
2 (B.3)
45For all e ,w eh a v e =0 , and (B.3) holds with equality. For all  ≤ e  we have  ∈ (02],a n d is
decreasing with . Since (B.3) holds with equality for  =0 , for any optimal quality that is positive, we have
(B.3) holds with strict inequality. Therefore, whenever U integrates, U responds with counter-merger, and
the payoﬀs are as determined in Subgame (4). Given that U does not integrate, the industry conﬁguration
is (2) if U integrates, and it is (1) if it does not. Therefore, U integrates with D1 if
Π
(2)
 + Π
(2)
2 ≥ Π
(1)
 + Π
(1)
2 (B.4)
Equilibrium payoﬀs in (2) depends on the size of the installed base diﬀerence. For  ≤ b  inequality (B.4)
can be rewritten as
−
¡
12 +1 8 
2 − 12
2 +2 
2
2 +
√
1 −  (9 − 9 +3 ) − 18
¢
18(1 − )
≥
1
2
,
which is simpliﬁed to
18 − 18
2 − 2( − 6 +6 )−
√
1 −  (9 − 9 +3 ) ≥ 0,
holds for all  ≤ b  (and hence, U integrates). For b  inequality (B.4) can be rewritten as
¡
2 − 2 −
√
1 − 
¢2
2(1− )
≥
1
2
,
which is simpliﬁed to 1 −  ≥ 1,d o e sn o th o l df o ra n y0 (and hence, U does not integrate).
Going backwards, U decides for integration. If U integrates, U responds with counter-merger, and
the equilibrium is characterized with (4), which yields
Π
(4)
 + Π
(4)
1 =
(3(1 −  (1 − )) +  (1 − ))
2
18(1 −  (1 − ))
−

2
2
.
If U does not integrate, and if  ≤ b  U integrates with D2 (industry conﬁguration (2a)), U and D1
46obtain
0+
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
.
Therefore, if  ≤ e  U integrates if
(3(1 −  (1 − )) +  (1 − ))
2
18(1 −  (1 − ))
−

2
2
≥ 0+
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
which holds with strict inequality for  ≤ e  and with equality for  ∈
³
e b 
i
.
Note that e  ≤ b  as
3(1− )
2 − 
≤
3
p
(1 − ) − 3(1 − )

,
which be simpliﬁed to
2(1− ) −
³√
1 − 
´
(2 − ) ≤ 0,
holds with strict inequality for all 0.
If b  U does not integrate with D1 (industry conﬁguration (1)), and U and D1 obtain  +1 2.
Since e  ≤ b , for all b  we have  =0 , and hence, U integrates if
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
≤  +
1
2
,
which can be simpliﬁed to

2 − 9(1− ) − 12 (1 − ) ≥ 0,
does not hold for any (1 − ).
B.8 Proof of Proposition 4. I begin with studying best response of U.G i v e nt h a tU  integrates, the
industry conﬁguration is (4) if U integrates, and it is (2) if it does not. If  ≤ b  the sum of equilibrium
payoﬀso fU  and D1 in (2) are deﬁned as in (2a):
0+
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
47Therefore, U integrates if
(3(1 −  (1 − )) +  (1 − ))
2
18(1 −  (1 − ))
−

2
2
≥
(3(1 − )+)
2
18(1 − )
(B.5)
For  ∈
³
e b 
i
, quality of interconnection is connectivity is zero, and hence, (B.5) holds with equality. For
e , optimal quality of interconnection is positive, and hence, (B.5) holds with strict inequality. This
concludes that if  ≤ b , best response of U to a merger between U and D2 is to engage in counter-merger.
If b  the sum of equilibrium payoﬀso fU  and D1 in (2) are deﬁned as in (2c), and is
¡
3 − 3 +  − 3
√
1 − 
¢¡√
1 − 
¢
2(1− )
+
1
2
.
For all b  equilibrium quality of interconnection is zero in (4). Therefore, U integrates if
(3(1 − )+)
2
9(1 − )
≥
¡
3 − 3 +  − 3
√
1 − 
¢¡√
1 − 
¢
2(1− )
+
1
2
(B.6)
which can be simpliﬁed to
(3(1 − )+)
2 − 9
³√
1 − 
´³
3(1 − )+ − 3
√
1 − 
´
− 9(1 − ) ≥ 0
which is not true for any b . To see this, let the left hand side of this inequality denoted by ().W e
have 
³
b 
´
=0 ,a n d
()

= 
³
2 − 6 − 9
√
1 −  +6
´
 0
for all (1 − ). Therefore ()  0 for all b . This concludes that if b , best response of
U to a merger between U and D2 is not to integrate with D1.
Given that U does not integrate, the industry conﬁguration is (3) if U integrates, and it is (1) if it
does not. Therefore, U integrates if
2
¡
6 − 
2 − 6 − 9
¢
+1 8− 3
p
(1 −  )(3− 3 −  )
18(1 − )
≥  +
1
2
48which simpliﬁes to
 ≤
3
µ
2 − 2+
√
1 −  +
q
(1 − )
¡
(12 + 13) − 12
¡√
1 − 
¢¢¶
4
≡  (B.7)
For all  U does not integrate.
Going backwards, U decides for integration. If U integrates, U responds by integrating if  ≤ b ,a n d
by not integrating, otherwise. Therefore if U integrates, for all  ≤ b , the equilibrium is characterized by
(4) and for all b  it is characterized by (2). If U does not integrate, it knows that U will respond by
integrating if  (and hence the equilibrium is characterized by (3)), and by not integrating otherwise
(and hence the equilibrium is characterized by (1)). One can show that we have b  for all  ∈ (01).I f
 ≤ b ,U  integrates as
(3(1 −  (1 − )) −  (1 − ))
2
18(1 −  (1 − ))
−

2
2
≥ 0+
(3(1 − ) − )
2
18(1 − )
holds with strictly inequality for all  ∈
h
0e 
i
and with equality for all  ∈
³
e b 
i
.I f  ∈
³
b 
´
,U 
integrates as
0+
¡
2 − 2 −
√
1 − 
¢2
2(1− )
≥
(3(1 − ) − )
2
18(1 − )
can be simpliﬁed to (3(1 − ) − )−3
¡
2 − 2 −
√
1 − 
¢
≤ 0, which holds for all b .I f,U  does
not integrate as
0+
¡
2 − 2 −
√
1 − 
¢2
2(1− )

1
2
,
which can be simpliﬁed to 1 − 
√
1 − , is true for all  ∈ (01).
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